

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE LEARNING TO GET IT RIGHT



**By
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In the final analysis, of course, I remain solely responsible for interpretation of fact and expression of opinion.

FOREWORD

My intention in writing this book was to retrace my steps and determine the results of close to forty years of experience as a consultant for international development programs. I wished to draw lessons that would advance my understanding of events and their consequences and to share them with professional colleagues. Most of all, however, I wished to share them with those who, as concerned citizens of the most influential democracy in the world, must remain abreast of the problems and prospects of international assistance if the lives of those in the less developed countries are to be significantly improved.

Sometime after I began my explorations, I was invited by the editor of *Interplan*, the newsletter of the International Division of the American Planning Association, to contribute a series of articles that reviewed some of my most important international activities. In those articles I began to examine the practical results of my professional life. Later the Organization of American States offered me a research grant to finance visits to a number of countries and examine the consequences of earlier activities. The result is this book.

The experiences I relate deal with one small corner of an immense effort by the international aid community to assist people of the less developed countries to lift themselves out of conditions of poverty and provide them with an opportunity to achieve a measure of self-control of their destiny. Such an enormous and unprecedented effort — which addresses such global crises as environmental degradation, disease, human rights atrocities and ethnic wars — progresses inexactly. However, with

increased knowledge of the actions involved, and drawing lessons from the experiences, we learn to do better.

Although the focus of my concern is the effort of the international community to assist the less developed nations to improve their overall situation, there is little discussion of major physical improvements such as large dams, electrical systems, and major highways. Rather my story deals primarily with efforts to build and carry out strategies for improving the effectiveness of indigenous, democratic institutions, principally local and other sub-national governments. However, development programs are not easily circumscribed and inevitably expand to incorporate an array of interests and groups, both private and governmental. Such has been the case with all of the experiences I relate.

As I have worked in over twenty countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia under more than fifty different contractual arrangements, it would have been neither possible nor useful to try to examine the outcomes of all of the programs with which I have been associated. I have, therefore, focused primary attention on those development efforts which were of sufficient size that something important was presumed to have resulted, were initiated long enough ago that if something significant was going to happen one would assume it would already have occurred, and where my own involvement was such that I knew, or at least should have known, exactly what was taking place.

I give more attention to development efforts in Latin America than to other regions. This is not from preference. Rather it is due to proximity and the greater possibility of retracing my steps, reestablishing contacts, and ferreting out the details of events around which organizational memory is vague and unsure. However, from a cursory examination of my work in other less developed regions of the world, I believe that the

difficulties encountered as well as the results achieved in Latin America are sufficiently common to international development programs in other areas of the world to validate the lessons I draw.

Not unexpectedly, my story is replete with histories of development efforts that failed to achieve their stated objectives. In all instances, though, I believe they teach lessons which, if taken to heart, should help make people considerably better off by the close of the Twenty First Century than at the close of the Twentieth.

Determining the results of most development efforts is excruciatingly difficult as so many divergent groups, contrasting interests and ideas, and varying economic and environmental concerns come to be involved. Many of these aspects of the situation are undetected initially but grow to become important. Others loom large at first but gradually recede in significance. Still others are simply impossible to determine at any point in time. An excellent example is the long effort to improve local governance in Venezuela. The program, which began in the mid-1960s with outside financial and technical assistance and is the subject of the chapter, Programming Municipal Development, has not lived up to early promise—and for me has proved a bitter disappointment. Yet, in 1998 over 70 percent of the eligible population of Venezuela voted without major incident in a presidential election, rejected the candidates of the two major political parties, and elected a new, minority candidate. This was virtually an unprecedented event in a regional culture prone to autocratic behavior and interference in political elections. How much the development program under review contributed to such an astonishing result can not be determined. However, as the program dealt for several decades with empowering the citizens of the country, it has to have had an effect. Similarly, it is impossible to forecast all of the myriad ramifications of the presidential election of 1998 on the future well-being of Venezuela.

It follows that when evaluations take place is of enormous significance in the determination of the effects of a particular development effort. If a careful evaluation of the Venezuela assistance program had been made a decade after its inception it would have received high marks. By the mid-1990s, however, the results were deeply disappointing. How the results will be measured in 2010 is impossible to predict with assurance.

The Venezuelan experience, along with the others I cite, demonstrate that there are no quick fixes when dealing with matters that affect the human condition. However, careful, honest evaluations can identify key impediments and enable us to draw lessons applicable to the design and implementation of future development efforts.

The most powerful lesson to be drawn from my professional experiences is that for a country to advance efforts to improve the life situation of its citizens, it is necessary to involve them in the processes of development. Autocratic, top-down government can work for the benefit of a few. It can not work for the good of the many. Empowering people and improving their capacity for managing affairs at the local and national levels is necessary. Every one of my experiences underscores this important lesson. There are many others.

I began my professional career as a city manager in the United States after graduating from Indiana University with a major in economics and obtaining a masters degree in public administration from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. However, as a city manager I increasingly found myself more concerned with the dynamics of urban and regional growth and change than with the

management of the many housekeeping activities of cities. I therefore returned to school and took a second graduate degree, this time in city planning at Harvard University. My initial consultancy took place immediately upon the completion of my studies there in January of 1956. Much later, in order to have an opportunity to reflect on my chosen career and to catch up with developments in regional planning, I took a sabbatical from my consulting activities to spend a year as a fellow at MIT. All of these experiences contributed to my search for improved measures for providing assistance to the peoples of the Third World.

* * * *

If a reader uses any part of this book as a case study or to advance a particular argument in a talk or publication, I would greatly appreciate it if the user would send me notification of its application and, if possible, the results of such use. Similarly, if a reader wishes to comment on any aspect of the work, I would be happy to respond — preferably by e-mail: chasboyce@aol.com. Regular mail should be sent to: 287 Harvard St. Apt. 40, Cambridge, MA 02139.

CHAPTER 1. *URBAN RENEWAL IN A LATIN CULTURE*



My first job as a development consultant took place in Puerto Rico in 1956. The opportunity occurred by chance. While at Harvard I became friends with a number of fellow students from Puerto Rico. One of these was the vice-director of the Puerto Rico Housing Authority. He was completing work on his Ph.D. at the same time as I was finishing my master's studies. Just weeks before we were both through he received a cable from the director of the authority asking him to locate a consultant in the states who could assist their agency in getting the commonwealth's urban rehabilitation program underway. He approached me with the offer.

I already had several job offers which under most circumstances would have appeared eminently satisfactory, but the chance to live for a time in the exotic Caribbean, and to serve as a consultant on a new approach to urban ills, struck me as an irresistible opportunity. As it turned out, my involvement with Puerto Rico came at a crucial moment in its history and was the emotional and intellectual catalyst that determined my career-long involvement with international development.

* * * *

Although Puerto Rico is part of the United States, both its culture and economy are sufficiently similar to many of the small Latin American countries that it would only be of academic importance as to whether or not it is an independent country. Until 1898 when it was wrested from Spain by the United States, the island was an impoverished and neglected colony of that country. The American government was interested in removing Spanish influence from the Caribbean and, in the process, establishing its own naval bases at various strategic locations within the region. The public rationale was the well publicized struggle that Cuba, another Spanish possession, was making to gain its independence. American troops invaded both islands and secured them within days. There was no question about the permanent acquisition of Cuba whose people had clearly signaled their intention to become independent. Puerto Rico, however, was a different case. Poorer and with fewer natural resources, it had only been negotiating with Spain for greater autonomy, not independence. This rather nebulous state of affairs suited the prevailing political climate of both the U.S. and Puerto Rico, although exactly what constitutes an acceptable degree of autonomy for the island is an issue which to this day is still producing agonies of indecision.

Within the context of the government of the United States and its national constitution, the status of Puerto Rico has over the years undergone a series of transformations, the full story of which centers around the on-going struggle of the Puerto Rican people for ethnic dignity and economic viability. 1/ After an extended series of political pushes and pulls, congress approved a special act that permitted Puerto Rico to draft and adopt its own constitution. In 1952, in an island-wide referendum, the people of Puerto Rico approved the resulting document; and Puerto Rico became a self-governing *Estado Libre Asociado*, or, as rendered in English, a commonwealth of the United States. In virtually all

governmental matters except two, Puerto Rico is a state comparable to the other fifty — its only representative in congress is a single, non-voting member and its residents do not vote for the president, and, under the dictum, "no taxation without representation," its residents do not pay federal income taxes.

After centuries as a pawn of the hegemonic ambitions of Spain and the U.S., by the mid-1950s Puerto Rico thought it had reached a stage of harmony with the U.S. The island was vibrant with new found enthusiasm. A political genius, Luis Munoz Marin, universally regarded as the father of modern Puerto Rico, was the governor of the new commonwealth — the first leader ever freely elected by the people of the island. Poet, philosopher, captivating speaker in both Spanish and English, he became a friend of numerous political luminaries including Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The United States government was touting the island as its showcase of "enlightened colonialism" and pouring money into the local economy. Evidence of optimism and innovation were in constant view. There were a variety of different types of public housing either in place or being readied for construction, and under the much publicized economic development program, Operation Bootstrap, every urban area, including many quite minor villages, was programmed to become the site of new industrial activities.

Efforts to transform the economy of the island from one based on colonial style agriculture — a few enormous sugar plantations and myriad small subsistence farms — to one sustained by industry were producing spectacular results. Between 1947 and 1959 the gross national product (GNP) figures for the island actually doubled. Incredible as it may appear now, by 1958 Puerto Rico's per capita income had become the highest in Latin America. 2/ It was a period when, on average, a new industrial plant started operations every day.

A series of favorable conditions was providing an exceptionally favorable investment climate for U.S. businesses. Not only was there strong, executive leadership in the governor's office, supported by an inordinate number of outstanding administrators devoted to both Munoz Marin and his new political party, *el Partido Popular Democratico*, but the economic incentives that had been put in place were remarkable for their diversity and effectiveness. For example, the commonwealth constructed and leased factory buildings on favorable terms; from 1947 onward U.S. firms establishing businesses on the island received a ten-year exemption from local taxes; and congress exempted their activities from federal corporate taxes.

One of the most astute moves by the government of Munoz Marin, I have always felt, was the early construction of an air conditioned international airport and an attractively designed and luxurious hotel, the Caribe Hilton. During its early years, before a hurricane dashed waters through its corridors, the ground floor of the hotel was open from entrance to ocean — a spectacular and inviting gathering place. The airport and hotel not only encouraged tourism but enabled business executives to fly in with their families and/or colleagues, be accommodated, do their business, swim, dine, and, under strict government regulations, gamble in splendid surroundings.

The commonwealth government had also launched an imaginative and far-reaching program of historical restoration — to restore to Old San Juan the color, architecture and ambiance of the Spanish colonial era of the 16th - 18th centuries. There is very little like it in the rest of the Americas. Each year it attracts millions of visitors and accounts for a major portion of Puerto Rico's \$1.5 billion tourist business.

One of the first books I read in preparation for going to Puerto Rico was Earl Parker Hanson's 1955 homage to the island's renaissance, *Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico*. The first sentence, written by Rafael Pico, chairman of the Puerto Rico Planning Board, reads, "This is the story of a small island with few resources other than the ingenuity and determination of its people. It tells how a backward, underdeveloped society has emerged from its past and today stands as a symbol of progress." 3/ It was an inspiring story and one I hoped to become a part of.

* * * *

Basically, the housing authority asked me to spend a year advising on the policies and procedures for initiating urban upgrading activities under special provisions of the Federal Housing Act of 1954. That legislation introduced the concept of the rehabilitation of rundown urban neighborhoods. It was intended to complement and greatly expand upon existing efforts at slum clearance and redevelopment.

A key part of my responsibility was to prepare and see through the initial stages a pilot project that would demonstrate preferred policies and procedures for the overall program. The intention was to put in place a process for the *continuous renewal* of Puerto Rico's urban communities. This was to be accomplished through a diagnosis of the kinds of assistance required by the different sections of each of the island's principal cities and towns and then carrying out upgrading activities in a systematic manner programmed over an extended period of time. I was delighted to undertake the assignment, and the many Puerto Ricans with whom I dealt were uniformly cooperative and created a strongly supportive work environment.

To orient myself to the local scene, I spent considerable time wandering in and around wretchedly poor areas where I was always treated in a friendly manner. A particularly pleasant treat during these excursions was to try to locate the "one hundred percent corner" — never a difficult task for it was invariably the noisiest with a series of jukeboxes blasting forth the latest *merengue* music — take outdoor lunch and converse in my rudimentary and heavily accented Spanish with the local inhabitants.

With the gathering violence in the states and Puerto Rico in the 1980s and 90s, I have often reflected on what I remember as the marked civility of the low-income communities of the cities and towns of Puerto Rico during the 1950s and 60s. Not only did I and my colleagues walk with complete lack of concern, but a close friend recently told me a remarkable story of personal safety — or the general lack of concern for same — during that era. In the early 1960s he was working in the governor's office when Vice-President Johnson visited the island. One morning both my friend and the vice-president rose unusually early and by chance met at the hotel where the vice-president was staying. As always, Johnson was vigorous and interested and, that morning, wanted to take a "power walk" and visit a local slum. Incredibly, my friend escorted him, alone, without the Secret Service, without anyone else, on an excursion through La Perla, a vast slum that at the time was as infamous as any of the waterfront areas of Marseilles, Hong Kong or other major seaports of the world. People of La Perla recognized the vice-president and hailed him with a wave and shout. He responded in kind, and they passed on without incident or concern — until, that is, the Secret Service in a panic finally caught up with them and the walk proceeded with greater decorum.

With my colleagues I soon began work on the design of the pilot project intended to illustrate the approach to be taken in the conservation

and rehabilitation of a common type of low-income community. The task was to identify those areas of a representative town that were predominantly residential, where conditions were generally poor, but where a significant number, perhaps a majority, of the structures could be rehabilitated rather than demolished. Through a program of selective clearance, improvement of basic infrastructure (better sidewalks, street lighting, etc.), enforcement of updated building codes and ordinances, and special financial incentives for the owners of the buildings, the areas would be brought up to acceptable standards. The logic seemed impeccable. Indeed, as outlined in the manner above, it still does.

I first began to develop a sense of unease when several young, graduate architects from Puerto Rico were assigned to work with me. I suggested that as a first task we should visit together several of the poorest neighborhoods of San Juan that might be representative of some areas to be improved. One extremely hot and humid day (and Puerto Rico can be *very* hot and *very* humid) we visited several waterfront slums. Walking through the areas and examining the housing, which included the underparts of a number of tightly packed shanties, several of my young colleagues became physically ill. In the following round table discussion back at the office, I realized that none of them had ever before visited any of the slums of the island. They were without exception intelligent, decent, eager — and totally without knowledge of the conditions they were expected to ameliorate. Unfortunately, this was probably a fair description of myself as well.

The town selected for our pilot effort was San Sebastian, a modest sized town in the western portion of the island which continues to serve as an important marketing center for the surrounding rural areas. The actual project site encompassed a small residential neighborhood, known as Guayabal, adjacent to the central commercial district of the town.

Guayabal was a homogeneous neighborhood. Most of its structures were single family residences, owner occupied, of simple wooden frame construction. In general, they consisted of a small living room, which also served as a dining area (with a small front porch opening immediately onto the street), two modest-sized bedrooms, a kitchen, a small inside bathroom, a tiny backyard used primarily for laundry and two or three fruit trees, and two modest-sized side yards, each perhaps four feet in width. Each structure, including the small front porch, enclosed about 500 square feet of space. While these were quite modest accommodations by standards accepted by much of urban America, they were quite generous when compared to the physical conditions in which the majority of Puerto Ricans lived.

Both San Sebastian and the Guayabal section were selected because we believed they best represented the types of situations that lent themselves to assistance through the new urban renewal program. However, neither the selection of the town nor the project site was based on an intensive exchange with the local residents or their elected leaders. Essentially, we believed we came bearing gifts. A partnership of the national and commonwealth governments would improve the basic infrastructure of a key residential neighborhood adjacent to the commercial heart of the town, and modest loans under favorable terms would be available to the householders which would enable them to improve their living accommodations — a boon for everyone.

* * * *

The major difficulty we encountered in the design of the project was the determination of the "acceptable standards" to which the houses were to be made to conform. This was of more than passing interest. In order

for an owner to qualify for a home improvement loan the improvements would have to bring the residence up to standards approved by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which, along with the Urban Renewal Administration (URA), was a major player in the effort at local improvement.

As the group worked on a number of issues, the one that began to open my mind to the realities of federally-imposed building standards concerned the minimum acceptable size of bedrooms. The federal officials insisted that a bedroom needed to have at least 90 square feet in order to accommodate a double bed, a side table, a small dresser and chair and permit easy use of these furnishings. If one granted that all of that furniture was needed in every bedroom of every house, an assumption with which we disagreed, they were correct. The problem arose because each of the bedrooms in virtually every house contained only about 75 square feet. The only way to bring the rooms up to federal standards would be to eliminate one of them to form a single room of some 150 square feet. To do so, however, would mean that almost the entire residential community would then consist of single bedroom dwellings — although the average family size was around five people.

I participated in innumerable meetings with the regional representatives of the FHA in an effort to convince the agency to apply standards that reflected the realities of the housing types found in the urban areas of the island. However, the FHA officials were adamant in their refusal. I recall a particular incident when one of these officials furiously pounded the conference table and stated in a commanding voice that ended any further discussion that if the agency's standards were good enough for Seattle, Washington, they were good enough for Puerto Rico. The outburst demonstrated such a startling lack of sensitivity to cultural

differences, I doubted the accuracy of my recollection until another participant at the meeting recently confirmed the episode.

Such meetings were accompanied, of course, by higher level negotiations by housing authority officials and other leaders of the commonwealth government and included special trips to Washington, D.C. Nothing worked: the policy shift of the national government designed to assist communities to upgrade themselves while holding down costs, reducing the displacement of families, and halting the wholesale destruction of urban neighborhoods was stymied. Rather than *urban renewal* through collaboration with low-income communities, work would continue on *urban redevelopment* by simply leveling the sites and uprooting the families.

Unfortunately, the government of Puerto Rico did not feel itself in a position to reject the financial assistance represented by either the urban renewal or the public housing program. On the contrary, officials of the commonwealth struggled desperately to develop additional projects and to get them approved. Whatever defects they might have, however disruptive of community life they might be, they meant significant employment, most particularly in construction and its allied industries. In the case of public housing, it was necessary to advance the program as rapidly as possible to demonstrate that, according to the requirements of the Federal Housing Act, "decent, safe and sanitary housing" was being made available to families displaced by the clearance programs.

Under such circumstances, it was impossible to complete the Guayabal project as intended, and subsequently the entire federally-supported urban conservation and rehabilitation program in Puerto Rico ground to a halt. Ultimately, the Guayabal area was condemned, cleared and re-parceled. Rather than demonstrating rehabilitation techniques and

serving as a harbinger of a new approach to community preservation, it became simply another slum clearance project.

After improving the road system and upgrading the water and sewer systems, approximately half of the project site was sold to commercial interests — to enlarge the central business district — while the other half was sold to individual families to construct attractive, concrete homes substantially more costly than anything that had previously existed in the area. Fortunately for my own emotional equanimity, long before these events transpired, I had left the island and returned to the states.

When in 1995 I again visited San Sebastian with former colleagues we found it difficult to even locate the site of the project. Not a single vestige of its former self existed. Remarkably, however, in an area immediately adjacent, where the houses replicated that of the project area, individual, private upgrading activities were still at work. A few remained in a state similar to those that existed in Guayabal in the mid-50s. Others had been improved through such measures as a modest extension of the family house, the introduction of metal louvers in the window spaces, and connections made to improved water and sewer systems. A few had been totally replaced by fashionable, concrete structures of modern design.

* * * *

Thrown into relief by the collapse of the program was a basic question: For whom were we planning the upgrading program, the current occupants or some future occupants? Or were we, essentially, uninterested in the occupants and concerned only with the quality of the structures? In all honesty, I can't say that I was able at the time to think through the situation and to arrive at the solution subsequently adopted by much of the international aid community: rather than to proceed from the application

of abstract norms, it is preferable to use as a base point the current situation of the majority of the people in a low-income community and seek to improve slightly the condition of the largest possible number. The better aim is to initiate a process of upgrading with one modest, but broadly applicable step following upon another, with the steps and their timing reflecting local circumstances.

During the urban renewal muddle, I also failed to appreciate the hazards encountered in dealing with community improvement efforts when a host of state and national agencies become involved in the process and bring to bear perceptions and attitudes irrelevant to the case at hand. In my own defense I can only say that I don't believe I was the most ignorant participant in the process. I knew that something was radically wrong — if not quite what — and years later was gratified to learn from a former colleague in Puerto Rico that my increasingly hysterical outbursts formed a regular part of the record of the proceedings.

Of course, the most egregious error was our belief that a set of standards affecting something as culturally sensitive as the style and condition of housing could be made applicable to widely varying local conditions. Illustrative of such difficulties is a situation I do not recall being discussed at the time of my stay in Puerto Rico. It would, however, have precluded approval of *any* housing conservation and rehabilitation measures for low and moderate-income families: FHA's unrelenting negative attitude toward wooden structures anywhere on the island. During my visit in 1995 I was astonished to read in the *San Juan Star*, Puerto Rico's principal English language newspaper, that FHA was still not insuring the financing of wooden or partially wooden houses there! This despite technological advances in the production of wood resistant to infestation as well as improved methods of construction that mitigate damage from windstorms.

The profession of city planning was not blameless. At the time, there was a fixation within the profession on the physical aspects of a situation, partly, I believe, because we were woefully ignorant of the dynamics of community life. Our social survey instruments — at least the ones we were using to plan urban renewal activities — were simplistic in the extreme. They captured only the information necessary to justify the projects and to provide data of a physical and economic nature that fed into the financial analyses required by the federal government. Although aware that something was amiss, as a group we were never able to overcome the city planner's professionally-inspired bias towards things rather than people. Consequently, the exercise in Puerto Rico, as well as elsewhere, became a frightening tug of war where everyone felt that what he or she was trying to do was for the benefit of the community — but the results were almost invariably calamitous. In the process many urban communities were permanently damaged if not outright destroyed.

Despite this early defeat, the story of urban renewal in Puerto Rico did not end with the collapse of the federally assisted program. The experience helped demonstrate that for improvement efforts of significance to take hold in an established community, the local residents must be an active partner in the process. The dynamics of such efforts involve so many diverse and complex considerations that no single set of individuals or public or private agencies — certainly no group of outside consultants — can deal successfully with them. Inevitably there are families of differing needs, capabilities, ethnicity, and inclination to collaborate; owners of property of varying financial means and interests; physical conditions of considerable diversity; basic infrastructure in varying degrees of decay and obsolescence; and a physical setting which requires the attention of the larger community and, as a result, its active involvement in the improvement process.

The lesson is being applied today in Puerto Rico. Efforts that draw heavily on community involvement to upgrade the low-income communities of the commonwealth are increasing, often proceeding with energy and imagination. An evolving model is a much publicized improvement program on the Cantera peninsula in San Juan — home to over 12,000 people and many small businesses and community enterprises. The program is built on a partnership of a community-based council elected by the residents of the area's eleven neighborhoods, numerous civic organizations, business leaders, and concerned professionals. The program addresses considerably more than housing and basic infrastructure. It includes educational programs on environmental concerns, cleanup and reforestation campaigns, and a locally operated recycling effort; it promotes cultural activities as well as a leadership training program; and it demonstrates that local improvement efforts are not built around a quick fix, rather they extend over very long periods.

Unfortunately, over the intervening years much of the optimism of the people of Puerto Rico that the government of the United States can understand its development needs and will respond in a sympathetic and sensitive manner has been lost. The commonwealth is suffering through difficult times. The glories of Operation Bootstrap ended dramatically in 1973 when the newly created Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boosted the world price of petroleum considerably above that of mainland Gulf Coast producers. Puerto Rico's well advanced plans, based on the importation of crude oil, to become one of the hemisphere's principal refining centers as well as home to a vast petrochemical industry collapsed. 4/

I much regret the difficulties that Puerto Rico has encountered since those early, halcyon days of the commonwealth, for it was my pleasure in

being there for a part of that period, and the respect I acquired for the Puerto Rican people, that directed me into what became my life's work.

NOTES

1. The story of this struggle is reviewed with insight and sympathy by Raymond Carr in a special study undertaken for the Twentieth Century Fund, *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

3. Earl Parker Hanson, *Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955).

4. The story of this economic catastrophe for Puerto Rico is particularly well presented by Sherrie L. Baver, *The Political Economy of Colonialism: The State and Industrialization in Puerto Rico*, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993).